If Rick Nash played for Toronto, Montreal, Boston, or at least a dozen other NHL franchises, we would be talking about him in the same breath as Alexander Ovechkin, Sidney Crosby, and the other young superstars that have reinvigorated the post-lockout NHL.
Instead, Nash is a gem of a player who thrills those who see him but is largely unknown to the casual fan. He’s not a nobody, by any stretch of the imagination, but he certainly does not get the respect and acknowledgement of a player of his caliber. That makes him all the more thrilling for those who do know about him.
Nash has a couple of strikes against him. First, obviously, he plays in Columbus, which is a newer franchise, in the Western Conference, playing in a division that has been dominated by the Detroit Red Wings for a decade. He played two seasons in the NHL before the lockout, thereby completely stripping him of that new player smell from those who joined the league in the 2005-06 season or afterwards.
Furthermore, Nash has been a one man show for much of his career in Columbus. Not until Steve Mason asserted himself as a rookie last season has Columbus had another player really worth paying attention to, talent-wise. Since his rookie season Nash had led the Blue Jackets in goals five of six seasons and points in three of six seasons, and has worn the captain’s C since 2008. He’s been their only All-Star representative since the 2003 game and was one of three players from the roster to take part in the 2006 Winter Olympics.
Few players have scored at the consistency of Nash in the past four seasons. He has 202 goals in 453 games (coming into today’s game). Twice he’s been in the top 5 in goal-scoring, sharing the Rocket Richard trophy in 2003-04.
Unlike Ovechkin, however, scoring stats aren’t the only place Nash excels. A much more apt comparison to Nash isn’t Ovechkin, but fellow Russian Pavel Datsyuk. There’s a reason Nash averages over two minutes a game on the penalty kill, and it’s not because Columbus Coach Ken Hitchcock likes having a scoring threat on the PK (though Nash has 11 shorties since 2007-08 including 2! on 3-on-5 situations.
No, Nash kills penalties because he’s a damned good penalty killer. He’s not just offensively gifted, he’s defensively responsible and hustles over all 200 feet of the ice (unlike some first line skaters in Washington). That is a learned skill for Nash…in his first three seasons he played 1:02, 3:36, and 7:18 over the course of each season, or just under 11 minutes total through 208 games before demonstrating that his special teams talent extended to both ends of the rink.
When he does score, though, man does Nash score pretty goals. He is very similar to Ovechkin in that both are what commentators love to call “big rigs.” Nash is listed at 6’4” and 218 pounds, and if you’ve ever seen his promos for the NHL Network you know he’s carrying at least 230 on that frame.
If you watch any of his highlight-reel goals (and what is it about Phoenix and giving up impressive goals? They're on that list three times), though, it’s clear Nash skates more like a Mike Green than a Matt Bradley. I’ve never seen a player of his size as quick on his feet and pull such nasty moves. His slap shot and wrist shot velocity isn’t up to Ovechkin’s level, but then again whose is? He’s more of an analog to Brett Hull, using a quick release and pinpoint accuracy rather than brute force to beat the goalie.
Team captain, leading scorer, primary weapon on the power play, solid penalty killer, floats like a butterfly and hits like a freight train…Nash might be the closest thing to the mythical ‘complete player’ in the NHL today. A lot of that is out of necessity: as his team’s best player he had to fill in every role.
That, of course, doesn’t detract at all from the talent and poise of Nash, who is still just 25 years old. He had the option, as an impending UFA after last season season, to jump to a bigger market (like Toronto) or better team (unlike Toronto) but chose to remain in Columbus, recognizing the talent finally accumulating there (he’s one of only six players to have spent more than two seasons in a Columbus uniform) and the fact that he has not yet reached his pinnacle as an NHL player.
So while as a Capitals fan and reporter covering the team, I’ll never tire of watching Ovechkin, Alexander Semin, Backstrom and Green in action, this afternoon if given the choice my eyes will be on one 61 for Columbus, to see the magic he can work.
Showing posts with label Power play. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Power play. Show all posts
Sunday, November 1, 2009
Monday, October 12, 2009
Statistics Lie to You
At Verizon Center for tonight's game between the Caps and the Devils, while flipping through the Game Notes, I saw a couple numbers that reminded me not to put undue stock in the team's special teams performance through the first five games of the season.
At the moment, Washington is 6 for 24 on the power play, an even 25%. That would have been good enough for 3rd place overall in the NHL last year, right behind the Red Wings (25.5%) and the 08-09 Caps (25.2%). Through 1 1/2 weeks of the 09-10 season, it's only good for T-12th. Last season's 12th place team was Chicago, converting at 19.3%.
Conversely, the Caps have allowed 6 goals on 27 penalty kills, giving them a 77.8% success rate, tied for 13th in the NHL. That same percentage in 2008-09 would have placed them at 27th in the league, right behind Tampa Bay (78%) and just ahead of Edmonton (77.5%). [As an aside, Detroit was only 25th with a 78.3% kill rate] Again, on the flip side, the 13th best penalty kill last season was Columbus at 82.1%...a full 1.5 percentage points ahead of where the Caps finished, in 17th at 80.6%.
At the moment, Washington is 6 for 24 on the power play, an even 25%. That would have been good enough for 3rd place overall in the NHL last year, right behind the Red Wings (25.5%) and the 08-09 Caps (25.2%). Through 1 1/2 weeks of the 09-10 season, it's only good for T-12th. Last season's 12th place team was Chicago, converting at 19.3%.
Conversely, the Caps have allowed 6 goals on 27 penalty kills, giving them a 77.8% success rate, tied for 13th in the NHL. That same percentage in 2008-09 would have placed them at 27th in the league, right behind Tampa Bay (78%) and just ahead of Edmonton (77.5%). [As an aside, Detroit was only 25th with a 78.3% kill rate] Again, on the flip side, the 13th best penalty kill last season was Columbus at 82.1%...a full 1.5 percentage points ahead of where the Caps finished, in 17th at 80.6%.
Friday, October 2, 2009
Reflections on the Taking of Faceoffs
Thursday night was a huge night for Brooks Laich. The 26-year-old left wing/center had two power play goals and an even strength assist in a pretty dominating victory over the reigning regular season Eastern Conference champions Boston Bruins.
One of the overplayed storylines of the summer, in terms of the Caps, was the addition of power forward Mike Knuble to bring grit, net presence, or whatever you want to call it…a big body to sit in front of the net. George McPhee called the free agent signing a no-brainer, and the underlying narrative was that Knuble brought a necessary aspect to the Capitals roster that was heretofore missing.
The unsaid aspect of that story, of course, is that Washington’s other power forward-type players weren’t getting the job done. Chris Clark was hurt and Eric Fehr had a pair of bum shoulders, but wither Brooks Laich? For a fair amount of the season Laich split his time on the first two lines, though he found great success in the playoff on a checking line with David Steckel and Matt Bradley.
Statistically Laich had a pretty damn good season: 23 goals, 53 points (both career highs), and appeared in every single regular season and playoff game for the second straight year. His average time on ice (ATOI) increased significantly for the fourth straight year.
On the power play, Laich jumped from 10th amongst Caps forwards in power play time, with 1.22 minutes per 60, to 5th at 2.43 min/60, and his when he did get on the power play in 2008-09 it was frequently on the first unit. While his production was almost the same as Knuble’s (27 goals, 47 points), the perceived difference between the two was Knuble’s willingness to put his big frame in front of the net (Knuble is just an inch taller than Laich, but listed at 23 pounds heavier).
In any case, the point is that coming into Thursday’s season opener the expectation was that when Washington fielded a full lineup Knuble would be on the right wing on the first line with Alexander Ovechkin and Nicklas Backstrom while Laich would be on the left wing with Brendan Morrison and Mike Knuble, and the first power play unit would be Semin, Backstrom, and Knuble with Ovechkin and Mike Green on the points.
If you watched the game, you’d know that what we actually got was a first line of Ovechkin-Backstrom-Semin and a second line of Laich-Morrison-Knuble, and a first power play unit of Laich-Backstrom-Semin with Ovechkin and Green (when I refer to the first unit in the remainder of the article, this five-man unit is what I mean).
If you were watching even closer, you would have noticed something else about the power play unit. While Laich was the man in front of the net, he also took all three single first unit faceoffs.
This struck me immediately as requiring further research, so I took a look at the faceoff report to see what was going on.* [Note 1: This image is courtesy of flickr user clydeorama. Note 2: It was obviously not taken at Thursday's game.]
Washington had 3:25 of power play time over the course of four power plays (they scored 15 and 16 seconds into two Boston penalties, and had a third power play cut short by a Green penalty). During that time, there were three faceoffs for which the Caps’ first unit was on the ice: at 13:22 of the first period, 17:00 of the first, and the opening faceoff of the third.
Not only did Laich take all three faceoffs, he was the primary centerman. That’s an important distinction, as this analysis doesn’t hold much weight if Backstrom had been kicked out of the dot at any point, necessitating Laich as the only other player with experience as center on the ice to take the faceoff.
Why was Laich, who is a natural center but plays primarily on the left wing, taking those faceoffs? During the offseason Laich’s name has been batted around as a possible second-line center with Sergei Fedorov’s departure, but after Morrison’s acquisition that possibility was basically squashed. Laich appeared in four preseason games, appearing as a wing during five-on-five play.
When you take a look at the faceoff reports from those four games, though, Laich actually took twelve faceoffs. Every single faceoff was in a special teams situation—four on the power play, eight on the penalty kill. That corresponds with the data from the Boston game, in which all three of his faceoffs taken were on the power play.
Laich and Backstrom only appeared in two preseason games together, September 23rd against Chicago and the 27th against the Rangers. They were both on the power play together, and if you look at the eight power play faceoffs for which they were on the ice, responsibility was split 50-50.
Here’s the funny thing: Brooks Laich was pretty terrible in the faceoff dot throughout the preseason. He was 4-of-12, a pretty rough 33% success rate (with an admittedly puny sample size). Out of the four power play faceoffs Laich took, all in the offensive zone with Backstrom on the ice, the Canadian was 1-of-4. His other eight faceoffs were on the penalty kill, which makes a lot more sense considering he was paired with Knuble, Clark, or other non-centers.
By comparison Backstrom was much better at the faceoff dot with a larger sample size, finishing 31-of-56, or 55%. On the power play he was 8-of-13, more specifically in the offensive zone he was 5-of-8, and even more specifically in the offensive zone with Laich on the ice he was a perfect 2-for-2.
Last year Laich was several percentage points better than Backstrom at the faceoff dot in the regular season, 51.1% to 48.7%, though Backstrom took over twice as many faceoffs in the same amount of games. Their faceoff stats on the power play were both good, with Laich winning 82-of-154 (53.2%) and Backstrom 101-of-201 (50.2%).
However you look at it Backstrom was statistically superior as a center throughout the preseason and the two were basically indistinguishable last year. The question at the heart of this inquiry is: Why? As in why the hell would Boudreau have Laich take every offensive zone faceoff against Boston when he was so much worse than Backstrom? The faceoff at center ice to start the third period isn’t all that key, but both offensive zone draws took place late in the first period with the game scoreless—crucial faceoffs for a team on the road.
There are a litany of reasons a different player than the center might take a draw, some valid in this situation and some not, as to why Laich was in the circle:
First, the normal center got kicked out of the dot. Obviously this wasn’t the case.
Second, the normal center would do a better job in front of the net screening in case of a shot right off the draw. Not in this instance either—Backstrom and Laich are basically the same size, and there’s no argument Laich has better technique of the two in the net.
Third, Laich was preferred because he could draw to a specific player. Laich and Backstrom are both left-handed in terms of their stick, which would have both drawing back to the same guy, Ovechkin.
Fourth, Laich was preferred because a win from the right faceoff circle would send the puck to Ovechkin in the center of the ice for an immediate shot. Again, Backstrom and Laich shoot from the same side.
Fifth, Laich has a better matchup against the opposing center. Here we have something. Looking back to last year, in four games against the Bruins Laich was a fantastic 19-for-31 (61.3%) against the Bruins in the faceoff circle, and he fared by far the best against Marc Savard (9-for-14 [including one night where he was 6-of-7] or 64.3%). By comparison he was 3-for-7 (42.9%) against Boston's other primary penalty-killing center, Patrice Bergeron. [Note: image courtesy of flickr user Dan4th.]
Save asking Boudreau directly (and him actually giving a straight answer), a matchup based on the expectation that Savard would be taking the faceoff is a reasonable expectation. When we consider Boston’s complete penalty killing unit, and the situation Thursday night, that reasoning doesn’t hold up. Savard and Bergeron play together as a penalty-killing pairing.
Furthermore, home teams get the last change, and the road team’s center has to be at the faceoff dot first. Therefore Boston knew who Washington would send to the dot, in this case Laich, before making the decision of whether Savard or Bergeron took the faceoff. It was a conscious decision to send Savard. He only took two drops against Laich, those two in Boston's defensive end. Bergeron took three of Boston's other short-handed faceoffs, with Steve Begin taking the one to open the third period.
Therefore, it's almost certain Boudreau had the information about Laich's success against Savard, and Bruins coach Claude Julien either ignored the same information or was not aware (not covering the Bruins, I don't know which is more likely). So Laich's presence in the faceoff circle was a calculated move based on past percentages.
Of course, in all of this we lose sight of the big picture that Laich’s actual performance in the dot was irrelevant to the ensuing play. After his first faceoff, and one win, the Caps controlled the play and Laich himself managed a shot 12 seconds later before Green eventually took a penalty later in the shift.
The two faceoffs Laich lost, one in offensive zone late in the first frame and one at center ice to kick off the third period? He scored within sixteen seconds on each, from what he called maybe “a combined two feet out from the goal line,” after some slick passing from his teammates freed him up to set up at the weakside post.
The real lesson, if there is one, to take from Laich’s offensive zone power play faceoffs is that whether Boudreau has a well thought out strategy or is going with his gut instinct, in one game actual success in the faceoff circle on the power play was unrelated to the ensuing play.
As the regular season continues and we see more of what the Caps' strategy is in certain situations, we'll have a clearer idea if this was a one-game lark or something we should expect to see more frequently.
*The faceoff sheets for the games discussed are as follows:
9.17: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010018.HTM
9.21: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010051.HTM
9.23: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010071.HTM
9.24: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010076.HTM
9.27: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010100.HTM
10.1: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC020001.HTM
One of the overplayed storylines of the summer, in terms of the Caps, was the addition of power forward Mike Knuble to bring grit, net presence, or whatever you want to call it…a big body to sit in front of the net. George McPhee called the free agent signing a no-brainer, and the underlying narrative was that Knuble brought a necessary aspect to the Capitals roster that was heretofore missing.
The unsaid aspect of that story, of course, is that Washington’s other power forward-type players weren’t getting the job done. Chris Clark was hurt and Eric Fehr had a pair of bum shoulders, but wither Brooks Laich? For a fair amount of the season Laich split his time on the first two lines, though he found great success in the playoff on a checking line with David Steckel and Matt Bradley.
Statistically Laich had a pretty damn good season: 23 goals, 53 points (both career highs), and appeared in every single regular season and playoff game for the second straight year. His average time on ice (ATOI) increased significantly for the fourth straight year.
On the power play, Laich jumped from 10th amongst Caps forwards in power play time, with 1.22 minutes per 60, to 5th at 2.43 min/60, and his when he did get on the power play in 2008-09 it was frequently on the first unit. While his production was almost the same as Knuble’s (27 goals, 47 points), the perceived difference between the two was Knuble’s willingness to put his big frame in front of the net (Knuble is just an inch taller than Laich, but listed at 23 pounds heavier).
In any case, the point is that coming into Thursday’s season opener the expectation was that when Washington fielded a full lineup Knuble would be on the right wing on the first line with Alexander Ovechkin and Nicklas Backstrom while Laich would be on the left wing with Brendan Morrison and Mike Knuble, and the first power play unit would be Semin, Backstrom, and Knuble with Ovechkin and Mike Green on the points.
If you watched the game, you’d know that what we actually got was a first line of Ovechkin-Backstrom-Semin and a second line of Laich-Morrison-Knuble, and a first power play unit of Laich-Backstrom-Semin with Ovechkin and Green (when I refer to the first unit in the remainder of the article, this five-man unit is what I mean).
If you were watching even closer, you would have noticed something else about the power play unit. While Laich was the man in front of the net, he also took all three single first unit faceoffs.
This struck me immediately as requiring further research, so I took a look at the faceoff report to see what was going on.* [Note 1: This image is courtesy of flickr user clydeorama. Note 2: It was obviously not taken at Thursday's game.]
Washington had 3:25 of power play time over the course of four power plays (they scored 15 and 16 seconds into two Boston penalties, and had a third power play cut short by a Green penalty). During that time, there were three faceoffs for which the Caps’ first unit was on the ice: at 13:22 of the first period, 17:00 of the first, and the opening faceoff of the third.
Not only did Laich take all three faceoffs, he was the primary centerman. That’s an important distinction, as this analysis doesn’t hold much weight if Backstrom had been kicked out of the dot at any point, necessitating Laich as the only other player with experience as center on the ice to take the faceoff.
Why was Laich, who is a natural center but plays primarily on the left wing, taking those faceoffs? During the offseason Laich’s name has been batted around as a possible second-line center with Sergei Fedorov’s departure, but after Morrison’s acquisition that possibility was basically squashed. Laich appeared in four preseason games, appearing as a wing during five-on-five play.
When you take a look at the faceoff reports from those four games, though, Laich actually took twelve faceoffs. Every single faceoff was in a special teams situation—four on the power play, eight on the penalty kill. That corresponds with the data from the Boston game, in which all three of his faceoffs taken were on the power play.
Laich and Backstrom only appeared in two preseason games together, September 23rd against Chicago and the 27th against the Rangers. They were both on the power play together, and if you look at the eight power play faceoffs for which they were on the ice, responsibility was split 50-50.
Here’s the funny thing: Brooks Laich was pretty terrible in the faceoff dot throughout the preseason. He was 4-of-12, a pretty rough 33% success rate (with an admittedly puny sample size). Out of the four power play faceoffs Laich took, all in the offensive zone with Backstrom on the ice, the Canadian was 1-of-4. His other eight faceoffs were on the penalty kill, which makes a lot more sense considering he was paired with Knuble, Clark, or other non-centers.
By comparison Backstrom was much better at the faceoff dot with a larger sample size, finishing 31-of-56, or 55%. On the power play he was 8-of-13, more specifically in the offensive zone he was 5-of-8, and even more specifically in the offensive zone with Laich on the ice he was a perfect 2-for-2.
Last year Laich was several percentage points better than Backstrom at the faceoff dot in the regular season, 51.1% to 48.7%, though Backstrom took over twice as many faceoffs in the same amount of games. Their faceoff stats on the power play were both good, with Laich winning 82-of-154 (53.2%) and Backstrom 101-of-201 (50.2%).
However you look at it Backstrom was statistically superior as a center throughout the preseason and the two were basically indistinguishable last year. The question at the heart of this inquiry is: Why? As in why the hell would Boudreau have Laich take every offensive zone faceoff against Boston when he was so much worse than Backstrom? The faceoff at center ice to start the third period isn’t all that key, but both offensive zone draws took place late in the first period with the game scoreless—crucial faceoffs for a team on the road.
There are a litany of reasons a different player than the center might take a draw, some valid in this situation and some not, as to why Laich was in the circle:
First, the normal center got kicked out of the dot. Obviously this wasn’t the case.
Second, the normal center would do a better job in front of the net screening in case of a shot right off the draw. Not in this instance either—Backstrom and Laich are basically the same size, and there’s no argument Laich has better technique of the two in the net.
Third, Laich was preferred because he could draw to a specific player. Laich and Backstrom are both left-handed in terms of their stick, which would have both drawing back to the same guy, Ovechkin.
Fourth, Laich was preferred because a win from the right faceoff circle would send the puck to Ovechkin in the center of the ice for an immediate shot. Again, Backstrom and Laich shoot from the same side.
Fifth, Laich has a better matchup against the opposing center. Here we have something. Looking back to last year, in four games against the Bruins Laich was a fantastic 19-for-31 (61.3%) against the Bruins in the faceoff circle, and he fared by far the best against Marc Savard (9-for-14 [including one night where he was 6-of-7] or 64.3%). By comparison he was 3-for-7 (42.9%) against Boston's other primary penalty-killing center, Patrice Bergeron. [Note: image courtesy of flickr user Dan4th.]
Save asking Boudreau directly (and him actually giving a straight answer), a matchup based on the expectation that Savard would be taking the faceoff is a reasonable expectation. When we consider Boston’s complete penalty killing unit, and the situation Thursday night, that reasoning doesn’t hold up. Savard and Bergeron play together as a penalty-killing pairing.
Furthermore, home teams get the last change, and the road team’s center has to be at the faceoff dot first. Therefore Boston knew who Washington would send to the dot, in this case Laich, before making the decision of whether Savard or Bergeron took the faceoff. It was a conscious decision to send Savard. He only took two drops against Laich, those two in Boston's defensive end. Bergeron took three of Boston's other short-handed faceoffs, with Steve Begin taking the one to open the third period.
Therefore, it's almost certain Boudreau had the information about Laich's success against Savard, and Bruins coach Claude Julien either ignored the same information or was not aware (not covering the Bruins, I don't know which is more likely). So Laich's presence in the faceoff circle was a calculated move based on past percentages.
Of course, in all of this we lose sight of the big picture that Laich’s actual performance in the dot was irrelevant to the ensuing play. After his first faceoff, and one win, the Caps controlled the play and Laich himself managed a shot 12 seconds later before Green eventually took a penalty later in the shift.
The two faceoffs Laich lost, one in offensive zone late in the first frame and one at center ice to kick off the third period? He scored within sixteen seconds on each, from what he called maybe “a combined two feet out from the goal line,” after some slick passing from his teammates freed him up to set up at the weakside post.
The real lesson, if there is one, to take from Laich’s offensive zone power play faceoffs is that whether Boudreau has a well thought out strategy or is going with his gut instinct, in one game actual success in the faceoff circle on the power play was unrelated to the ensuing play.
As the regular season continues and we see more of what the Caps' strategy is in certain situations, we'll have a clearer idea if this was a one-game lark or something we should expect to see more frequently.
*The faceoff sheets for the games discussed are as follows:
9.17: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010018.HTM
9.21: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010051.HTM
9.23: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010071.HTM
9.24: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010076.HTM
9.27: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC010100.HTM
10.1: http://www.nhl.com/scores/htmlreports/20092010/FC020001.HTM
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